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MAKING DECISIONS

ABOUT TRANSIT
The practice of dealing with deficits by putting off repairs and
maintenance was good politics even if it was bad for transit's
future. But shape and productivity issues must be resolved.
The system must be scaled not to arbitrary historical
standards, but to meet the region's travel and economic needs.
by
DA YID SCHOENBROD

Reshaping and streamlining transit to improve the most essential
services will ultimately make the system better for both riders and transit workers.
Though critical parts of such a program, such as eliminating less-used services and
imposing higher workloads on some employees, will bring cries of anguish in the short
run, the choices must be faced because large subsidies to transit will grow larger, even
with substantial fare hikes and only modest wage increases, unless costs are cut. The
power to cut service and increase productivity, however, resides in institutions that
have tended to sacrifice the public's long-term interests for short-term political favor. How then can an accountable form of government make transit decisions that take
adequate account of the future?
This is not a new problem. The practice of dealing with transit deficits
by putting off repairs and maintenance rather than by raising the fare or increasing
subsidies was good politics even as it was bad for transit's future. The harm done had
· its impact at a later date, after the next election, unlike a fare hike or a tax increase.
Such myopia in.government is not confined to transit. New York City's
and State's borrowing to meet current expenses, which promoted the fiscal crises of
the mid-1970s recalled eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume's warning that:
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It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an expedient, as enables
him to make a great figure during his administration, without overburdening the people with taxes, or exciting any immediate clamors against
himself. The practice therefore of contracting debt will almost infallibly be
abused, in every government.
So most state constitutions try to forbid borrowing to meet current
expenses. State constitutions do not prohibit allowing transit or other public facilities
to deteriorate, even though deterioration is like the forbidden debt in motive and
impact. Courts have had enough trouble trying to make controls on debt effective;
controls on deterioration would be even harder to implement.
Hidden borrowing through deterioration plagues public services other
than transit-from education to bridges-but the problem is particularly acute for
transit because it is so capital intensive and because so much of its capital plant is
hidden from public view. Reductions in the most significant parts of the education
budget, for example, will soon show up in how the classroom looks or in terms of
what goes on inside it. On the other hand, major portions of the transit budget could
be cut without immediately detectable consequences.
Before getting too sophisticated in thinking about a smaller, more
efficient transit system, it is important to consider that the process to make the
decisions has· worked primitively. Our institutions were unable to respond to transit's
physical and mechanical decay until that decay was so palpable that it was truly
oppressive for riders and became a prominently discussed reason for major employers
to leave New York City. What was done to enable our institutions to try to repair the
damage? Can our improved institutions cope with decisions about the system's shape
and productivity? If not, what further improvements are needed?
Dealing With The fostifutional Problems
The first four decades in the history of New York's subways
demonstrated how myopically transit was treated. From the day the first subway
opened at the start of this century through a long era of inflating costs, the political
process kept the fare at a nickel. As the WPA Guide To New York City reported in
1939, "The 5-cent fare-a recurring issue in municipal politics-is not likely to be
increased in the immediate or distant future. The New Yorker is extremely sensitive
on this point." When, as a result, the private corporations that operated subways
became insolvent; the city took over these lines and ultimately had to increase the
fare, but the politics of transit still meant that there was more sensitivity to the level of
the fare than to the physical integrity of the system.
The state legislature created the New York City Transit Authority in
1953 to take over the city's transit system. The TA was designed to overcome the
problems of the past; the TA Board, which is now the same as the MTA Board, was to
operate the system "for the convenience and safety of the public on a basis which will
enable the operations thereof, exclusive of capital costs, to be self-sustaining." The
statute thus fixed responsibility for the good repair of the system on a seemingly
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independent board with the power to raise the money needed to fulfill that
responsibility. Specifically, the board was given the power and the duty to increase
fares to cover operating expenses, taking account of grants from other units of
government. As to capital spending needs, the statute provided that they "shall be
paid· by the city .... "
The TA was never as independent as it seemed; and, in time, its power
became more apparent than real. The city's obligation to pay for capital costs, except
when incurred with the city's approval, was subject to an annual limit of $5 million,
below what was needed from the start. And despite the board's theoretical
independence, decisions about raising the fare still involved the governor, the mayor,
and other political leaders. Nonetheless, in the TA's first decade, the fare was high
enough to sustain almost the entire operating budget, and the city provided
reasonable amounts of capital funds. This changed in the late 1960s. With rising labor
costs and falling ridership, the fare increases needed to cover operating costs were
politically unacceptable. Therefore, the operating budget was balanced through
increasingly large subsidies and reductions in repairs and cleaning. Some capital funds
were used to make up for the shifts in the operating budget and, later, even diverted
into the operating budget in a device known as the "Beame shuffle." But the fiscal
crisis in 1975 put an end to this. Needed capital projects were left undone, and
preventive maintenance "deferred."
Making Hard Decisions
So the power to decide how much would be spent to keep the system in
good repair remained in the political process, even though the 1953 statute seemed to
insulate this decision from politics. Political leaders could take credit for "saving the
fare," but were insulated themselves from responsibility for poor service. As Ross
Sandler and I wrote in A New Direction in Transit, a 1978 Department of City
Planning report to Mayor Koch:
Transit managers, whose jobs are at the sufferance of political leaders, are
not in a position to point out the consequences of inadequate funding for
transit. The result-is that political leaders announce the good news, transit
managers announce the bad, and neither presents the entire story.

The process was irresponsible.
During the last several years, however, some hard decisions have had to
be made to provide more resources for repair and rehabilitation. But significant gains
will take years because the backlog of disrepair is great and the work takes substantial
time. Some of the key decisions were:
• The MTA Board's explicit decision to end "deferred maintainance" as a
means to balance the budget;
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• Voters' approval of a state transportation bond issue that provides
funds for capital improvements;
• The state legislature's enactment of a package of new taxes to provide
operating funds for the MTA; and
• The state legislature's grant to the MTA of the power to float bonds for
capital improvements backed by farebox revenues.
These changes shift power and responsibility. In the past, the future of
the system was sacrificed to short-term political expediency. Capital funding was
determined not by what the board judged was needed, but by what the city-and later
the state and federal government-would give. Now, the power to issue fare-backed
bonds helps the board gear its capital program to its assessment of need. Paying off
the bonds, as well as ending deferred maintainance, will require either an increase in
the fare or additional subsidies. So the board now has more power to end the
present's mortgaging of the future and can put the choice of how heavily to subsidize
the fare where it belongs, in the political process.
Why were elected officials willing to give the MT A Board this potentially
embarrassing power as well as to advocate new taxes and tax-backed bond issues and
to sanction significant fare increases? First, the deterioration of transit had become
increasingly visible, making the need for some response patent.
In addition, the ability of politicians to blame poor service on the MTA
was eroding. The direct participation of governors and mayors in transit decisions was
evident in their unwillingness to "trade in" Westway funds for transit. And the federal
Clean Air Act placed responsibility to improve transit as a pollution control strategy
upon the state. In l976 litigation under this act resulted in Governor Carey's being
judged a violator for failure, among other things, to implement transit improvement
strategies. To extract himself from this legal predicament, the governor committed
himself, under the statute, to prepare and implement a program, with funding,' to
make transit service adequate. Federal EPA's refusal, from 1978 to 1980, to approve
the governor's proposed plans increased the pressure to fund transit more adequately.
Moreover, in 1978, A New Direction in Transit specified, for the first
time, what had to be done to make transit service decent. It showed that dramatic
improvement was not only possible but was essential to the region's economic vitality.
Through this report transit managers provided information that previously had not
been made public about what really needed to be fixed and at what cost,
Finally, and perhaps most important, in the face of mounting criticism,
Governor Carey appointed a new MTA chairman in 1979, Richard Ravitch, who was
unique among his predecessors in his independence of the governor. Ravitch argued
from his first day in office that transit funding was inadequate and waged campaigns
for financing that put the governor and other political leaders on the spot.
Hybrid
The changes in power over transit have made the MTA function as a
new sort of creature,. a hybrid between a_ state agency and a state authority. An
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agency, headed by an official who serves at the pleasure of the governor and operating
under a budget enacted by the legislature, is directly accountable to the political
process. An authority, run by a board whose members serve for staggered terms of set
duration and operating under its own budget that is _financed, ideally, with its own
revenues, is insulated from politics to a much greater degree. The strength of the
authority is meant to be its ability to conserve the public assets assigned to its control.
An authority is considered a better vehicle for floating revenue-backed bonds because
its structure gives it the power to resist politically motivated- actions that might
jeopardize the revenue. The authority's weakness is in making allocational "who gets
what" type decisions, such as how much to subsidize the fare.
·
As created in 1953, the Transit Authority was an authority in structure.
In time, however, it came to function as an agency because its care for transit
properties was made subservient to political decisions. The TA's basic legal structure
has remained constant since 1953, but the process that makes decisions within the
structure has changed. The. board has_,always had the power to set the fare. But, under
the new hybrid approach, the TA makes the managerial decision on the level of
spending necessary to maintain system assets, and then the political bodies make the
allocational decision about how much to subsidize the operating budget. Political
bodies, therefore, make the value choice· between token-buyers and taxpayers, while
the TA's final choice of a fare is a question of mathematics rather than values. This
process should be distinguished from the previous practice where notions of what are
acceptable levels of fare and subsidies determined the level of maintenance and
involved the board heavily in allocational choices, or at least in fronting for
allocational choices that others made.
Before celebrating the new process for transit governance in New York
and assessing its application to decisions about the system's shape and productivity, it
is important to see that our ability to deal with the system's disrepair may be only
transient and partial. The improved capacity to deal with disrepair has depended on
an MTA chairman and board willing to insist on their responsibility to preserve the
system-even if elected leaders ate put on the spot-and on public concern about an
acute deterioration in service. Should that concern abate, it would be tempting for a
governor to angle again toward an MTA Board that was more tractable. Even the
current board has had to bend sound fiscal practices to accommodate political
leaders. When the tax package that the legislature enacted produced less revenue in
1982 than promised and financial logic and concern about the rating of the farebacked bonds suggested that the fare be increased unless the legislature came up with
more money in 1982, the MTA finally Wentalong With legislative appeals that the fare
not be increased on the theory that the legislature would provide the additional
money later. Such practices are all too likely when the ·MTA depends on subsidies for
half its operating budget and most of its capital budget.
Decision Making Stymied
The system's shape and productivity involve even harder choices than
have been faced so far. When funds to remedy structural disrepair had to be raised,
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taxes were levied and other painful steps were taken rather than make basic decisions
about the system's shape or productivity. These two issues must now be resolved or
the system may suffer a fiscal hemorrhage that would endanger progress towards its
longer-term repair.
Our government institutions have largely failed on these issues. As for
the system's shape, there is no comprehensive vision of the region's needs in terms of
size, layout, or hours of operation. Nor is there any consensus as to who should make
the decisions. The actions taken so far have been crisis-oriented and reactive or
marginal in impact. In the past, elected officials and the MTA have often joined in
announcing cuts in the frequency of service or the closing of some token booths or
small pieces of the system as part of a last-minute package to limit the need for fare
increases or subsidies. There have been no major shrinkages in overall coverage in
recent years. But substantial sums were spent on two programs to expand the
system-the Second Avenue Subway and the new Queens line-one of which had to
be abandoned and the other reduced in scale because there were not enough funds
available to both complete the programs and keep the existing system going. The lack
of a comprehensive vision, that relates the system's shape to regional travel needs and
available resources has therefore already cost dearly.
The region still lacks the institutional means to deal intelligently with
the question of how and where. the system should shrink and grow. No official
document lays out the choices or recommends a course of action based upon service
reduction as a fiscal instrument, although chairman Ravitch recently announced that
work on this problem has begun. Moreover, it is unclear whether any entity has the
political legitimacy as well as the legal power to make system planning decisions.
Instead, significant initiatives seem to be vulnerable to veto by any number of
unspecifie(l political actors. This lack of decision-making capability reduces the
incentive for planners to produce the information needed to make informed choices.
,
Our ability to make decisions about productivity is ,almost as limited.
Increasing productivity has been discussed for years but, until the 1982 labor contract,
was more a subject for press announcements than for progress. The recent arbitrator's
decision struck down a host of written and unwritten work rules that would impede
progress on productivity. This is important, but it only opens the door. Decisions still
will have to be made as to what will be done, not just about intersticial questions but
also about such overarching matters as automation and shifts in staffing practices.
Who will speak for the public in these matters? Will it be the MTA management; or
will the governor and the mayor play a political role as they have in dealing with the'
wage rate? And. when there are disputes between management and employees, who
will decide? The arbitrated labor contract provides for an arbitration process for
matters that arise under the contract, but this process probably cannot cope with
some of the more important issues. In the meantime, no official document lays before
the public the range of ways to increase productivity and their consequences.
Shape and Productivity
Can the hybrid approach of the MTA dealing with managerial issues and
elected officials then handling allocational issues help with decisions about the
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system's shape and productivity? Shape and productivity issues seem to commingle
managerial and allocational issues. They do not lend themselves to a legislative forum
because of their technical complexity and the need for follow-through. At the same
time, they are politically hot and involve allocational questions that test the legitimacy
of a purely managerial body.
It is conceptually possible but politically difficult to apply the hybrid
model to shape and productivity issues. The MTA could, as manager, propose to carry
out a particular cut in service and then leave the political process to provide
additional subsidies if the change were to be averted. But an MTA initiative to, say,
eliminate a transit line would probably result in the MTA's having to back off without
substantial fiscal relief. It would bring out in the legislature, the Board of Estimate,
and other political arenas a strong negative reaction that the MTA would have to
attend to because so much of its budget is supplied by grants.
The political process has shown itself prompt to obstruct the MTA's
taking unpopular actions but loath to tell the MTA what to do instead. The state
legislature has, by separate enactments, forbidden closing a station, reducing the
frequency of service, eliminating routes, or increasing fares without first going
through special hearing procedures that focus attention on the detriments.
No similar procedures discourage the deterioration of transit that
results from the failure to provide adequate funds to maintain the existing system
properly. Rather than provide the funds needed, the legislature instead created, in
1981, an inspector general over the MTA to hear complaints and pay the MTA to fix
unsafe conditions that the MTA cannot afford to remedy. This is a gratuitious
complication of the management problems already facing the MTA. In the same vein,
the legislature passed a statute in 1982 to create a State Public Transportation Safety
Board, whose jurisdiction would include the MTA and the inspector general. This the
governor wisely vetoed. The MTA Board itself was established to look out for the
public interest. If a second board to oversee the first would do more than add
complication, there should then be a third board to supervise the second, and so on,
to make sure that all boards do their jobs right.
Improving the MTA'S Process
If the hybrid MTA is to make essential decisions about system shape and
productivity, a way must be found to deal with objections from actors who fail to
offer positive solutions. The MTA could presenr the choices in a form that would
diminish ..the political advantages of such opportunism. More specifically, the MTA
could offer its vision of transit's future in a report that estimated the resources
available for the years to come and the range of means that could be used to reconcile
needs and resources, including possible changes in the system's shape or in methods of
operation.
Because it does not now present such an array of options, the MTA sets
the stage for its critics to object to specific cost-saving initiatives, since how each
individual project serves the large! interest of the entire system is never spelled out.
Such criticism might be reduced in potency all the more if the MTA set out its own
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proposals at a conference like the one to be held on December 16, 1982, where an
informed audience could help to deflate demagogic attacks. Because responsible
positions usually involve owning up to advantaging or disadvantaging various groups,
the new context could help to elevate the MTA from everyone's scapegoat to an
arbitrator among interest groups.
As to productivity issues, the new context would alter what otherwise
would be bilateral management-labor confrontations by allowing others, including the
region's employers and employee organizations, to comment. The bilateral face-offs
make it seem as if productivity gains are labor's loss and that lack of progress results
only from labor's position rather than management's competence. The change in
context should help to make clear that productivity is not such a zero sum game. This
is particularly important because future subsidies for transit depend upon public
confidence that the money will be well-used.
An annual report and conference, by themselves; would not achieve a
substantial shift in focus because too many reports and hearings are already required.
These pass like proverbial ships in the night because they usually avoid the larger
choices of public concern by focusing on details. Where reports do highlight the
decisions to be faced, something is gained. A New Direction in Transit and the MTA's
follow-up report on disrepair received extensive attention from the press and public
officials because they dealt head on with a key question: how and at what cost to fix
the system.
Nothing similar has yet been done on the issues of shape and
productivity. This is not because the question lacks an audience. The press believes
that the public wants to know more about transit issues, as shown by the substantial ,
increase in newspaper coverage over the past several years.
It might be objected that the MTA's assuming the power to propose and
implement a transit strategy for the region would give too much power to an
unelected body, that the MTA would become a power unto itself like the Port
Authority. But the region could do worse than to have its transit run by the Port
Authority. And in any event, making transit strategy is what the MTA is, by statute,
supposed to do. The MTA is more a geographically representative body and less a
panel of experts because the New York City mayor and suburban county executives
nominate a majority of the MTA Board. Moreover, if the' legislature believes that the
MTA has gone too far, it can change the MTA's structure, which is not enmeshed in an
interstate compact as is the Port Authority's. Finally, the Port Authority is fiscally
self-sustaining while the MTA needs subsidy. Therefore the political process would
continue to influence MTA Board decisions. The danger is more in continued MTA
dependence rather than in excesses of independence. A hybrid MTA that made
manifest the options concerning the system's shape and productivity would not be free
of politics, but would help the political process to be more constructive.
Should We Replace the MTA ?
Perhaps it is not enough to try to enhance the MTA's ability to overcome
political opportunism that stalls needed decisions. Should there be a fundamental
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restructuring of transit governance by making the body that is responsible for
operations more independent by giving it the power to levy taxes to subsidize transit?
At what geographical scale should that body function? Ideally, the area
that benefits from transit most directly should be the area that decides upon and pays
for the subsidy. On that basis, the state is too large, and the individual municipalities
are too small. For instance, many suburbanites ride New York City subways and
buses, and many other suburbanites . would not be able to drive near the city if it
weren't for the city's transit system. Taxing for transit at the city level would mean
underfunding because many suburbanites would get a free ride.
An appropriate area for transit operations and financing would be
regionwide, but this presents interrelated political, policy, and constitutional
problems. The state legislature might be able to delegate the power to set tax rates to
an appointed board, but this is neither the typical approach to transit finance nor is it
advisable because an appointed board would Jack electorally generated pressure to
curb costs and taxes. An elected board would have to be selected under "one man,
one vote," and this would aggravate suburban fears of being victimized by the city.
On August 16, 1982, then-gubernatorial candidate Cuomo proposed
disbanding the MTA and turning transit over to agencies that would be more rather
than less tied into the political process. One would hope that Governor Cuomo will
realize that this proposal invites reliving the problems of the past. Putting agencies,
whether state or local, in charge of our capital intensive transit takes away the
protection that an independent board can provide against borrowing through
deterioration. Moreover, although the proposal is offered in the name of making both
the governor and the mayor more accountable for transit, the effect could be the
opposite. Cuomo wanted agencies of local government to run the various transit
operations and a state agency to take account of regional concerns. His proposal
promised that the respective duties and responsibilities of these agencies would be
spelled out at a later date, but it is doubtful that this could be done with sufficient
precision to make actual accountability clear. This problem would be particularly
acute in regard to finance. The city is too small a jurisdiction to collect taxes for
transit commensurate with the benefits that transit in the city bestows, The state
should provide subsidies through its agency, but how would the division of
responsibility be specified? The upshot, in any event, would be a division between
operating responsibility and financing power like that which jeopardizes the decisionmaking capacity of the MT A. Governor Cuomo is right in criticizing his predecessors
for hiding behind the MTA, but the appropriate remedy is for him to take the lead on
choices of substance rather than start a long debate about changes in the MTA
structure.
No Final Solution
Within the Jong-existing legal structure of the New York City Transit
Authority, chairman Ravitch and the MTA Board have created a new process that
begins with decisions about what is needed to preserve. the transit system rather than
what will make politicians look ~good. This change was not only essential, but
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legitimate, because the TA's board deals with the managerial question of the system's
condition while political bodies deal with the allocational questions of the level of the
fare and how to subsidize it. The MTA, however, has yet to develop a process to deal
with the more difficult problems of the system's shape and productivity. To do so, the
MTA must claim its responsibility and power by laying the choices before the public
that finances the system. These choices are all too likely to be avoided or submerged if
transit operations are made less independent in. the name of greater control by the
governor or mayor.
It may seen strange to recommend less than a radical restructuring of
transit governance when transit service and the way the system is run are so often
disappointing. Our system does not, however, have the special claim of pride on a
national budget that so benefits Paris, London, Moscow, and even Washington, DC.
It is overlarge and rundown and so is bound to require a large proportion of its
budget to be subsidized. It is also a big system so that the absolute size of the subsidy
makes it a major political issue. These stressful conditions have been dealt with better
in New York than in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, which all .have suffered
recent acute crises of transit governance.
·
The MTA is no "final" solution, but it would be a mistake to expect one.
The appropriate structure for transit decisions depends on the issues of the era. Issues
will most likely change as much in the future as they have in the first 80 years that
took us from the luxury accommodationj, of Vanderbilt's !RT to the 1950s notion that
expressways would make transit obsolete. The issues of the immediate future require a
strong MTA Board that can make transit operationally Jean and scale the system not to
some arbitrary historical standard but to meet the region's travel and economic needs.
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